Mechanism design without revenue equivalence [electronic resource] / Juan Carlos Carbajal and Jeffre...
Mechanism design without revenue equivalence [electronic resource] / Juan Carlos Carbajal and Jeffrey C. Ely.
About this item
Full title
Author / Creator
Publisher
Brisbane, Qld. : School of Economics, University of Queensland, 2012.
Date
2012.
Record Identifier
MMS ID
Language
English
Formats
Physical Description
Physical content
33 p.
Publication information
Publisher
Brisbane, Qld. : School of Economics, University of Queensland, 2012.
Series
Place of Publication
Queensland
Date Published
2012.
Subjects
Subject Keywords
- Australian
More information
Scope and Contents
Summary
We study mechanism design problems in quasi-linear environments where the en- velope theorem and revenue equivalence principle fail due to non-convex and non- differentiable valuations. Despite these obstacles, we obtain a characterization of in- centive compatibility based on the familiar Mirrlees representation of the indirect util- ity and a mon...
Alternative Titles
Full title
Mechanism design without revenue equivalence [electronic resource] / Juan Carlos Carbajal and Jeffrey C. Ely.
Authors, Artists and Contributors
Author / Creator
Author / Artists
Notes
General note
School of Economics discussion paper ; no. 458.
Title from title screen (viewed on Sept. 24, 2012)
"April 6, 2012"
Includes bibliographical references (p. 31-33)
System details note
Mode of access: Online. Address as at 24/09/2012: http://www.uq.edu.au/economics/458-mechanism-design-without-revenue-equivalence.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat reader to read PDF file.
Contextual Information
Other version (online)
Identifiers
Primary Identifiers
Record Identifier
74VvBoA0g7bg
Permalink
https://devfeature-collection.sl.nsw.gov.au/record/74VvBoA0g7bg
Other Identifiers
DDC
621.815
MMS ID
991016506549702626
