Optimal contracts for loss averse consumers [electronic resource] / Juan Carlos Carbajal and Jeffrey...
Optimal contracts for loss averse consumers [electronic resource] / Juan Carlos Carbajal and Jeffrey Ely.
About this item
Full title
Author / Creator
Publisher
Brisbane, Qld. : School of Economics, University of Queensland, 2012.
Date
2012.
Record Identifier
MMS ID
Language
English
Formats
Physical Description
Physical content
21 p.
Publication information
Publisher
Brisbane, Qld. : School of Economics, University of Queensland, 2012.
Series
Place of Publication
Queensland
Date Published
2012.
Subjects
Subject Keywords
- Australian
More information
Scope and Contents
Summary
We enrich the standard model of optimal contract design between a monop- olist and a continuum of potential buyers under asymmetric information by assuming that consumers have reference-dependent preferences and loss aversion. In our model, consumers are endowed with quasi-linear utilities over the quality parameter of a good sold by a monopolist....
Alternative Titles
Full title
Optimal contracts for loss averse consumers [electronic resource] / Juan Carlos Carbajal and Jeffrey Ely.
Authors, Artists and Contributors
Author / Creator
Author / Artists
Notes
General note
School of Economics discussion paper ; no. 460.
Title from title screen (viewed on Sept. 24, 2012)
"April 2012".
Includes bibliographical references (p. 20-21)
System details note
Mode of access: Online. Address as at 24/09/2012: http://www.uq.edu.au/economics/460-optimal-contracts-for-loss-averse-consumers.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat reader to read PDF file.
Contextual Information
Other version (online)
Identifiers
Primary Identifiers
Record Identifier
74VvBokOeXp3
Permalink
https://devfeature-collection.sl.nsw.gov.au/record/74VvBokOeXp3
Other Identifiers
DDC
658.8343
MMS ID
991016506629702626
