Competition and Information Leakage
Competition and Information Leakage
About this item
Full title
Author / Creator
Publisher
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press
Journal title
Language
English
Formats
Publication information
Publisher
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press
Subjects
More information
Scope and Contents
Contents
When seeking to trade in over-the-counter markets, institutional investors typically restrict both the number of potential counterparties they contact and the information they disclose (e.g., by requesting two-sided rather than one-sided quotes). We rationalize these important facts in a model featuring endogenous front-running. Although an additio...
Alternative Titles
Full title
Competition and Information Leakage
Authors, Artists and Contributors
Author / Creator
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Primary Identifiers
Record Identifier
TN_cdi_crossref_citationtrail_10_1086_727709
Permalink
https://devfeature-collection.sl.nsw.gov.au/record/TN_cdi_crossref_citationtrail_10_1086_727709
Other Identifiers
ISSN
0022-3808
E-ISSN
1537-534X
DOI
10.1086/727709
