Cournot Duopoly Games: Models and Investigations
Cournot Duopoly Games: Models and Investigations
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Basel: MDPI AG
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English
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Basel: MDPI AG
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This paper analyzes Cournot duopoly games that are constructed based on Cobb–Douglas preferences. We introduce here two models whose dynamic adjustments depend on bounded rationality, dynamic adjustment, and tit-for-tat mechanism. In the first model, we have two firms with limited information and due to that they adopt the bounded rationality mecha...
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Cournot Duopoly Games: Models and Investigations
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TN_cdi_doaj_primary_oai_doaj_org_article_ec2d916571d54056b2e1fee7b989691b
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https://devfeature-collection.sl.nsw.gov.au/record/TN_cdi_doaj_primary_oai_doaj_org_article_ec2d916571d54056b2e1fee7b989691b
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ISSN
2227-7390
E-ISSN
2227-7390
DOI
10.3390/math7111079
