Pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the spatial model with valence: existence and characterization
Pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the spatial model with valence: existence and characterization
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Publisher
New York: Springer US
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English
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Publisher
New York: Springer US
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Contents
Pure-strategy Nash equilibria almost never exist in spatial majority voting games when the number of positional dimensions is at least two, as the majority core is typically empty when more than one positional dimension is modeled. In the general setting of proper spatial voting games, we study the existence of equilibrium when one candidate has a...
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Full title
Pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the spatial model with valence: existence and characterization
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TN_cdi_hal_primary_oai_HAL_hal_04080514v1
Permalink
https://devfeature-collection.sl.nsw.gov.au/record/TN_cdi_hal_primary_oai_HAL_hal_04080514v1
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ISSN
0048-5829
E-ISSN
1573-7101
DOI
10.1007/s11127-021-00936-4
