The Political Economy of Clientelism
The Political Economy of Clientelism
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Publisher
Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd
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Language
English
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Publisher
Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd
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Contents
In this paper, we argue that the political-commitment problem provides an explanation for why much income redistribution takes an inefficient form, particularly employment in the public sector. A job is a credible way of redistributing when it provides rents (such as in situations with moral hazard), and employment is optimal ex post. Moreover, a j...
Alternative Titles
Full title
The Political Economy of Clientelism
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Author / Creator
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TN_cdi_hal_primary_oai_HAL_halshs_00846558v1
Permalink
https://devfeature-collection.sl.nsw.gov.au/record/TN_cdi_hal_primary_oai_HAL_halshs_00846558v1
Other Identifiers
ISSN
0347-0520
E-ISSN
1467-9442
DOI
10.1111/sjoe.12010