TAX FARMING REDUX: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE ON PERFORMANCE PAY FOR TAX COLLECTORS
TAX FARMING REDUX: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE ON PERFORMANCE PAY FOR TAX COLLECTORS
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Publisher
Oxford: Oxford University Press
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Language
English
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Oxford: Oxford University Press
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Contents
Performance pay for tax collectors has the potential to raise revenues, but might come at a cost if it increases the bargaining power of tax collectors vis-à-vis taxpayers. We report the first large-scale field experiment on these issues, where we experimentally allocated 482 property tax units in Punjab, Pakistan, into one of three performance pay...
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Full title
TAX FARMING REDUX: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE ON PERFORMANCE PAY FOR TAX COLLECTORS
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TN_cdi_proquest_journals_1780540933
Permalink
https://devfeature-collection.sl.nsw.gov.au/record/TN_cdi_proquest_journals_1780540933
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ISSN
0033-5533
E-ISSN
1531-4650
DOI
10.1093/qje/qjv042
