An Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Model for Carbon Emission Quota Allocation among Industries: Evidence...
An Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Model for Carbon Emission Quota Allocation among Industries: Evidence from Guangdong Province, China
About this item
Full title
Author / Creator
Ye, Fei , Li, Lixu , Wang, Zhiqiang and Li, Yina
Publisher
Basel: MDPI AG
Journal title
Language
English
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Publication information
Publisher
Basel: MDPI AG
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Scope and Contents
Contents
As the most cost-effective mechanism, an emissions trading scheme (ETS) plays an important role in mitigating global warming, whilst any such scheme requires the initial allocation of quotas. Current allocation methods, however, pay little attention to the interests of abatement entities, which will hinder the long-term sustainable goals. To mobili...
Alternative Titles
Full title
An Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Model for Carbon Emission Quota Allocation among Industries: Evidence from Guangdong Province, China
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Record Identifier
TN_cdi_proquest_journals_2389159299
Permalink
https://devfeature-collection.sl.nsw.gov.au/record/TN_cdi_proquest_journals_2389159299
Other Identifiers
ISSN
2071-1050
E-ISSN
2071-1050
DOI
10.3390/su10114210
