Dynamic Cournot-Nash Equilibrium: The Non-Potential Case
Dynamic Cournot-Nash Equilibrium: The Non-Potential Case
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Ithaca: Cornell University Library, arXiv.org
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English
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Ithaca: Cornell University Library, arXiv.org
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We consider a large population dynamic game in discrete time where players are characterized by time-evolving types. It is a natural assumption that the players' actions cannot anticipate future values of their types. Such games go under the name of dynamic Cournot-Nash equilibria, and were first studied by Acciaio et al., as a time/information dep...
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Dynamic Cournot-Nash Equilibrium: The Non-Potential Case
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TN_cdi_proquest_journals_2634668914
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https://devfeature-collection.sl.nsw.gov.au/record/TN_cdi_proquest_journals_2634668914
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2331-8422
