Moldy Lemons and Market Shutdowns
Moldy Lemons and Market Shutdowns
About this item
Full title
Author / Creator
Publisher
St. Louis: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Journal title
Language
English
Formats
Publication information
Publisher
St. Louis: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
More information
Scope and Contents
Contents
This paper studies competitive market shutdowns due to adverse selection, where sellers post nonexclusive menus of contracts. We first show that the presence of the worst type of agents (moldy lemons) causes markets to fail only if their mass is sufficiently large. We then show that a small mass of moldy lemons can lead to a large cascade of exits...
Alternative Titles
Full title
Moldy Lemons and Market Shutdowns
Authors, Artists and Contributors
Author / Creator
Identifiers
Primary Identifiers
Record Identifier
TN_cdi_proquest_journals_2648814959
Permalink
https://devfeature-collection.sl.nsw.gov.au/record/TN_cdi_proquest_journals_2648814959
Other Identifiers
DOI
10.17016/FEDS.2022.013
How to access this item
https://www.proquest.com/docview/2648814959?pq-origsite=primo&accountid=13902
