An iterative combinatorial auction mechanism for multi-agent parallel machine scheduling
An iterative combinatorial auction mechanism for multi-agent parallel machine scheduling
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Publisher
London: Taylor & Francis
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Language
English
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Publisher
London: Taylor & Francis
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Contents
This paper focuses on the multi-agent parallel machines scheduling problem with consumer agents and resource agents. Within the context, all the agents are self-interested aiming at maximising their profits, and have private information, precluding the use of the centralised scheduling approaches that require complete information of all the consume...
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Full title
An iterative combinatorial auction mechanism for multi-agent parallel machine scheduling
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TN_cdi_proquest_journals_2770808977
Permalink
https://devfeature-collection.sl.nsw.gov.au/record/TN_cdi_proquest_journals_2770808977
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ISSN
0020-7543,1366-588X
E-ISSN
1366-588X
DOI
10.1080/00207543.2021.1950938