Dynamic Cournot-Nash equilibrium: the non-potential case
Dynamic Cournot-Nash equilibrium: the non-potential case
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Publisher
Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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Language
English
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Publisher
Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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Scope and Contents
Contents
We consider a large population dynamic game in discrete time where players are characterized by time-evolving types. It is a natural assumption that the players’ actions cannot anticipate future values of their types. Such games go under the name of
dynamic Cournot-Nash equilibria
, and were first studied by Acciaio et al. (SIAM J Control Opt...
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Full title
Dynamic Cournot-Nash equilibrium: the non-potential case
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TN_cdi_proquest_journals_2821234589
Permalink
https://devfeature-collection.sl.nsw.gov.au/record/TN_cdi_proquest_journals_2821234589
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ISSN
1862-9679
E-ISSN
1862-9660
DOI
10.1007/s11579-022-00327-3
