Existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in discontinuous Bertrand games: a complete characteriz...
Existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in discontinuous Bertrand games: a complete characterization
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Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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English
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Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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Since (Reny in Econometrica 67:1029–1056, 1999) a substantial body of research has considered what conditions are sufficient for the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in games with discontinuous payoffs. This work analyzes a general Bertrand game, with convex costs and an arbitrary sharing rule at price ties, in which tied payoffs may b...
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Full title
Existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in discontinuous Bertrand games: a complete characterization
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TN_cdi_proquest_journals_2822558059
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https://devfeature-collection.sl.nsw.gov.au/record/TN_cdi_proquest_journals_2822558059
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ISSN
0020-7276
E-ISSN
1432-1270
DOI
10.1007/s00182-022-00830-3
