Tying in two‐sided markets with heterogeneous advertising revenues and negative pricing
Tying in two‐sided markets with heterogeneous advertising revenues and negative pricing
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Publisher
Cambridge: Wiley Subscription Services, Inc
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Language
English
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Publisher
Cambridge: Wiley Subscription Services, Inc
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Scope and Contents
Contents
We offer a theory of anticompetitive tying in two‐sided markets when below‐cost or negative pricing is possible. With the coexistence of two consumer groups (one regarding tying and tied goods as complementary and the other as independent), a tying‐good monopolist may face difficulties in extracting rent under separate sales and wish to use tying t...
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Full title
Tying in two‐sided markets with heterogeneous advertising revenues and negative pricing
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Author / Creator
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Record Identifier
TN_cdi_proquest_journals_2879048640
Permalink
https://devfeature-collection.sl.nsw.gov.au/record/TN_cdi_proquest_journals_2879048640
Other Identifiers
ISSN
1058-6407
E-ISSN
1530-9134
DOI
10.1111/jems.12547
