Evolutionarily stable strategy and invader strategy in matrix games
Evolutionarily stable strategy and invader strategy in matrix games
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Publisher
Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag
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Language
English
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Publisher
Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag
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In this paper, we consider the concepts of evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), neighborhood invader strategy (NIS) and global invader strategy (GIS) in single species with frequency-dependent interactions. We find some general relationships among the three concepts in matrix games. The main conclusion is that ESS and NIS are equivalent to each ot...
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Full title
Evolutionarily stable strategy and invader strategy in matrix games
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TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_1273260210
Permalink
https://devfeature-collection.sl.nsw.gov.au/record/TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_1273260210
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ISSN
0303-6812
E-ISSN
1432-1416
DOI
10.1007/s00285-012-0516-y
