Imperfect Public Monitoring with Costly Punishment: An Experimental Study
Imperfect Public Monitoring with Costly Punishment: An Experimental Study
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Publisher
Nashville: American Economic Association
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Language
English
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Publisher
Nashville: American Economic Association
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Scope and Contents
Contents
This paper experimentally investigates the effects of a costly punishment option on cooperation and social welfare in long, finitely repeated public good contribution games. In a perfect monitoring environment, increasing the severity of the potential punishment monotonically increases average net payoffs. In a more realistic imperfect monitoring e...
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Full title
Imperfect Public Monitoring with Costly Punishment: An Experimental Study
Authors, Artists and Contributors
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TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_1282038433
Permalink
https://devfeature-collection.sl.nsw.gov.au/record/TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_1282038433
Other Identifiers
ISSN
0002-8282
E-ISSN
1944-7981
DOI
10.1257/aer.102.7.3317
