Market Transparency, Adverse Selection, and Moral Hazard
Market Transparency, Adverse Selection, and Moral Hazard
About this item
Full title
Author / Creator
Publisher
Chicago: University of Chicago Press
Journal title
Language
English
Formats
Publication information
Publisher
Chicago: University of Chicago Press
Subjects
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Scope and Contents
Contents
We study how an improvement in market transparency affects seller exit and continuing sellers’ behavior in a market setting that involves informational asymmetries. The improvement was achieved by reducing strategic bias in buyer ratings. It led to a significant increase in buyer satisfaction with seller performance, but not to an increase in selle...
Alternative Titles
Full title
Market Transparency, Adverse Selection, and Moral Hazard
Authors, Artists and Contributors
Author / Creator
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Primary Identifiers
Record Identifier
TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_1866647572
Permalink
https://devfeature-collection.sl.nsw.gov.au/record/TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_1866647572
Other Identifiers
ISSN
0022-3808
E-ISSN
1537-534X
DOI
10.1086/688875
