Parties, Brokers, and Voter Mobilization: How Turnout Buying Depends Upon the Party’s Capacity to Mo...
Parties, Brokers, and Voter Mobilization: How Turnout Buying Depends Upon the Party’s Capacity to Monitor Brokers
About this item
Full title
Author / Creator
Publisher
New York, USA: Cambridge University Press
Journal title
Language
English
Formats
Publication information
Publisher
New York, USA: Cambridge University Press
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More information
Scope and Contents
Contents
Despite its prevalence, little is known about when parties buy turnout. We emphasize the problem of parties monitoring local brokers with incentives to shirk. Our model suggests that parties extract greater turnout buying effort from their brokers where they can better monitor broker performance and where favorable voters would not otherwise turn o...
Alternative Titles
Full title
Parties, Brokers, and Voter Mobilization: How Turnout Buying Depends Upon the Party’s Capacity to Monitor Brokers
Authors, Artists and Contributors
Author / Creator
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Primary Identifiers
Record Identifier
TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_1878799777
Permalink
https://devfeature-collection.sl.nsw.gov.au/record/TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_1878799777
Other Identifiers
ISSN
0003-0554
E-ISSN
1537-5943
DOI
10.1017/S0003055415000593
