Corruption and Competition in Procurement Auctions
Corruption and Competition in Procurement Auctions
About this item
Full title
Corruption and Competition in Procurement Auctions
Author / Creator
Publisher
Santa Monica: RAND
Journal title
The Rand journal of economics, 2005-04, Vol.36 (1), p.1-15
Language
English
Formats
Publication information
Publisher
Santa Monica: RAND
Subjects
More information
Scope and Contents
Contents
We investigate the effect of corruption on competition in procurement. Our assumption is that the bureaucrat (i.e., the agent that administers the market), if corrupt, may provide an opportunity for bid readjusments in exchange for a bribe. As firms expect to be paying a bribe, a mechanical effect of corruption is to increase the contract price by...
Alternative Titles
Full title
Corruption and Competition in Procurement Auctions
Authors, Artists and Contributors
Author / Creator
Identifiers
Primary Identifiers
Record Identifier
TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_38153044
Permalink
https://devfeature-collection.sl.nsw.gov.au/record/TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_38153044
Other Identifiers
ISSN
0741-6261
E-ISSN
1756-2171
