Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: a General Equilibrium Approach
Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: a General Equilibrium Approach
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Oxford, UK and Boston, USA: Blackwell Publishers Ltd
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Language
English
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Publisher
Oxford, UK and Boston, USA: Blackwell Publishers Ltd
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Scope and Contents
Contents
We consider an economy where contracts are necessary to encourage investments. Contract enforcement requires that a fraction of the agents work in the public sector and do not accept bribes. We find that: (1) It may be optimal to allow some corruption and not enforce property rights fully. (2) Less developed economies may choose lower levels of pro...
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Full title
Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: a General Equilibrium Approach
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Author / Creator
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TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_38620344
Permalink
https://devfeature-collection.sl.nsw.gov.au/record/TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_38620344
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ISSN
0013-0133,1468-0297
E-ISSN
1468-0297
DOI
10.1111/1468-0297.00347
