Braess's Paradox in Epidemic Game: Better Condition Results in Less Payoff
Braess's Paradox in Epidemic Game: Better Condition Results in Less Payoff
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London: Nature Publishing Group UK
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English
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London: Nature Publishing Group UK
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Contents
Facing the threats of infectious diseases, we take various actions to protect ourselves, but few studies considered an evolving system with competing strategies. In view of that, we propose an evolutionary epidemic model coupled with human behaviors, where individuals have three strategies: vaccination, self-protection and laissez faire and could a...
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Full title
Braess's Paradox in Epidemic Game: Better Condition Results in Less Payoff
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TN_cdi_pubmedcentral_primary_oai_pubmedcentral_nih_gov_3836038
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https://devfeature-collection.sl.nsw.gov.au/record/TN_cdi_pubmedcentral_primary_oai_pubmedcentral_nih_gov_3836038
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E-ISSN
2045-2322
DOI
10.1038/srep03292