Thinking off your feet : how empirical psychology vindicates armchair philosophy / Michael Strevens.
Thinking off your feet : how empirical psychology vindicates armchair philosophy / Michael Strevens.
Thinking off your feet : how empirical psychology vindicates armchair philosophy / Michael Strevens.
About this item
Full title
Author / Creator
Publisher
Cambridge, Massachusetts : The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2019.
Call Numbers
G 2019/2913
Record Identifier
MMS ID
Language
English
Formats
Physical Description
Physical content
345 pages : illustrations ; 25 cm
Content type
text
still image
Media type
unmediated
Carrier type
volume
Contents
Philosophical knowledge -- Classical and modern conceptual analysis -- Other forms of conceptual analysis -- The psychology of philosophy -- Natural kind concepts -- Conceptual inductivism -- Inductivism versus conceptual analysis -- Inductive analysis -- Reference -- The travails of analysis -- Aga...
Publication information
Publisher
Cambridge, Massachusetts : The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2019.
Date Published
2019.
Subjects
More information
Scope and Contents
Summary
In an original defense of armchair philosophy, Michael Strevens seeks to restore philosophy to its traditional position as an essential part of the quest for knowledge, by reshaping debates about the nature of philosophical thinking. His approach explores experimental philosophy's methodological implications and the cognitive science of concepts.--...
Alternative Titles
Full title
Thinking off your feet : how empirical psychology vindicates armchair philosophy / Michael Strevens.
Authors, Artists and Contributors
Author / Creator
Notes
General note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 327-336) and index.
Contextual Information
Date Copyright
©2019
Identifiers
Primary Identifiers
Call Numbers
G 2019/2913
Record Identifier
74VKVB84XmLy
Permalink
https://devfeature-collection.sl.nsw.gov.au/record/74VKVB84XmLy
Other Identifiers
ISBN
9780674986527
DDC
146.4
MMS ID
991024242106002626
