Weakest collective rationality and the Nash bargaining solution [electronic resource] / Nejat Anbarc...
Weakest collective rationality and the Nash bargaining solution [electronic resource] / Nejat Anbarci and Ching-jen Sun.
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Full title
Author / Creator
Publisher
[Melbourne] : School of Accounting, Economics and Finance, Deakin University, 2009.
Date
2009.
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MMS ID
Language
English
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Publication information
Publisher
[Melbourne] : School of Accounting, Economics and Finance, Deakin University, 2009.
Series
Place of Publication
Victoria
Date Published
2009.
Subjects
More information
Scope and Contents
Summary
The authors propose a new axiom, Weakest Collective Rationality (WCR) which is weaker than both Weak Pareto Optimality (WPO) in Nash (1950)'s original characterization and Strong Individual Rationality (SIR) in Roth (1977)'s characterization of the Nash bargaining solution. The authors then characterize the Nash solution by Symmetry (SYM), Scale In...
Alternative Titles
Full title
Weakest collective rationality and the Nash bargaining solution [electronic resource] / Nejat Anbarci and Ching-jen Sun.
Authors, Artists and Contributors
Author / Creator
Notes
General note
School working paper - Economic series / School of Accounting, Economics and Finance ; SWP 2009/16.
Title from title screen (viewed on 5 May, 2010)
At head of title: Faculty of Business and Law. School of Accounting, Economics and Finance.
"October 2009".
Includes bibliographical references (p. 6)
System details note
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader to read pdf file.
Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web. Available at: http://www.deakin.edu.au/buslaw/aef/workingpapers/papers/2009_16.pdf.
Contextual Information
Other version (online)
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Primary Identifiers
Record Identifier
74VKdalXpWAl
Permalink
https://devfeature-collection.sl.nsw.gov.au/record/74VKdalXpWAl
Other Identifiers
DDC
330.015195
MMS ID
991019955219702626
