Debt contracts with ex-ante and ex-post asymmetric information [electronic resource] : an example /...
Debt contracts with ex-ante and ex-post asymmetric information [electronic resource] : an example / G. Carlier and L. Renou.
About this item
Full title
Author / Creator
Publisher
[Adelaide] : School of Economics, University of Adelaide, 2005.
Date
2005.
Record Identifier
MMS ID
Language
English
Formats
Publication information
Publisher
[Adelaide] : School of Economics, University of Adelaide, 2005.
Series
Place of Publication
South Australia
Date Published
2005.
Subjects
More information
Scope and Contents
Summary
We consider a simple model of lending and borrowing combining two informational problems: adverse selection and costly state verification. Our analysis highlights the interaction between these two informational problems. We notably show that the higher the monitoring cost, the less discriminating the optimal menu of contracts is.
Alternative Titles
Full title
Debt contracts with ex-ante and ex-post asymmetric information [electronic resource] : an example / G. Carlier and L. Renou.
Authors, Artists and Contributors
Author / Creator
Author / Artists
Notes
General note
Working paper / University of Adelaide. School of Economics, 1444-8866 ; 2005-03.
Title from title screen (viewed on Aug. 5, 2011)
"4th February 2005"--P. 1.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 12)
System details note
Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web. Address as at 05/08/2011: http://www.economics.adelaide.edu.au/research/papers/
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat reader to access the document in PDF.
Contextual Information
Other version (online)
Identifiers
Primary Identifiers
Record Identifier
74VvKybKD8jA
Permalink
https://devfeature-collection.sl.nsw.gov.au/record/74VvKybKD8jA
Other Identifiers
DDC
332.1752
MMS ID
991007951919702626
