Monitoring the Monitor: Distracted Institutional Investors and Board Governance
Monitoring the Monitor: Distracted Institutional Investors and Board Governance
About this item
Full title
Author / Creator
Publisher
Oxford University Press
Journal title
Language
English
Formats
Publication information
Publisher
Oxford University Press
More information
Scope and Contents
Contents
Boards are crucial to shareholder wealth. Yet little is known about how shareholder oversight affects director incentives. Using exogenous shocks to institutional investor portfolios, we find that institutional investor distraction weakens board oversight. Distracted institutions are less likely to discipline ineffective directors with negative vot...
Alternative Titles
Full title
Monitoring the Monitor: Distracted Institutional Investors and Board Governance
Authors, Artists and Contributors
Author / Creator
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Primary Identifiers
Record Identifier
TN_cdi_crossref_primary_10_1093_rfs_hhaa014
Permalink
https://devfeature-collection.sl.nsw.gov.au/record/TN_cdi_crossref_primary_10_1093_rfs_hhaa014
Other Identifiers
ISSN
0893-9454
E-ISSN
1465-7368
DOI
10.1093/rfs/hhaa014
