Instrumental Reciprocity as an Error
Instrumental Reciprocity as an Error
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Basel: MDPI AG
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Language
English
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Basel: MDPI AG
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Contents
We study the strategies used by experimental subjects in repeated sequential prisoners’ dilemma games to identify the underlying motivations behind instrumental reciprocity, that is, reciprocation of cooperation only if there is future interaction. Importantly, we designed the games so that instrumental reciprocity is a mistake for payoff-maximizin...
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Full title
Instrumental Reciprocity as an Error
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TN_cdi_doaj_primary_oai_doaj_org_article_a1b1dd6c42af4d34920bed817fb5c06d
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https://devfeature-collection.sl.nsw.gov.au/record/TN_cdi_doaj_primary_oai_doaj_org_article_a1b1dd6c42af4d34920bed817fb5c06d
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ISSN
2073-4336
E-ISSN
2073-4336
DOI
10.3390/g9030066
