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Human Emotions and Fallible Judgments: A Pragmatist Sketch of Cognitivism

Human Emotions and Fallible Judgments: A Pragmatist Sketch of Cognitivism

https://devfeature-collection.sl.nsw.gov.au/record/TN_cdi_projectmuse_journals_842183_S1527938321300070

Human Emotions and Fallible Judgments: A Pragmatist Sketch of Cognitivism

About this item

Full title

Human Emotions and Fallible Judgments: A Pragmatist Sketch of Cognitivism

Author / Creator

Publisher

Pennsylvania State University Press

Journal title

The Journal of speculative philosophy, 2021-01, Vol.35 (3), p.289-303

Language

English

Formats

Publication information

Publisher

Pennsylvania State University Press

More information

Scope and Contents

Contents

The author argues that Peirce, James, and Dewey propose a version of emotional cognitivism (the position that an emotion is in effect a judgment and, as such, highly fallible). He goes on to highlight certain features of human emotions, conceived in this light, above all emotional reflexivity (the feelings we tend to have about our own feelings, e....

Alternative Titles

Full title

Human Emotions and Fallible Judgments: A Pragmatist Sketch of Cognitivism

Authors, Artists and Contributors

Author / Creator

Identifiers

Primary Identifiers

Record Identifier

TN_cdi_projectmuse_journals_842183_S1527938321300070

Permalink

https://devfeature-collection.sl.nsw.gov.au/record/TN_cdi_projectmuse_journals_842183_S1527938321300070

Other Identifiers

ISSN

0891-625X

E-ISSN

1527-9383

DOI

10.5325/jspecphil.35.3.0289

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