Do fiscal rules constrain political budget cycles?
Do fiscal rules constrain political budget cycles?
About this item
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Publisher
New York: Springer Science + Business Media
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Language
English
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Publisher
New York: Springer Science + Business Media
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Scope and Contents
Contents
We ask whether fiscal rules constrain incumbents from using fiscal policy tools for reelection purposes. Using data on fiscal rules provided by the IMF for a sample of 77 (advanced and developing) countries over the 1984–2015 period, we find that strong fiscal rules dampen political budget cycles. Our results are remarkably robust against inclusion...
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Full title
Do fiscal rules constrain political budget cycles?
Authors, Artists and Contributors
Author / Creator
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TN_cdi_proquest_journals_2551411157
Permalink
https://devfeature-collection.sl.nsw.gov.au/record/TN_cdi_proquest_journals_2551411157
Other Identifiers
ISSN
0048-5829
E-ISSN
1573-7101
DOI
10.1007/s11127-020-00797-3
