Dynamic Incentive Contracts in Multiple Penalty Systems with No-commitment to Tenure-track Auditing
Dynamic Incentive Contracts in Multiple Penalty Systems with No-commitment to Tenure-track Auditing
About this item
Full title
Author / Creator
Publisher
Wien: Springer-Verlag
Journal title
Language
English
Formats
Publication information
Publisher
Wien: Springer-Verlag
Subjects
More information
Scope and Contents
Contents
This paper generalizes Khalil's (1997) static model to a multiperiod one in the tenure-track auditing. Three penalty systems considered are full-transferdependent, partial-transfer-dependent, and transfer-independent ones. It is found that the equilibrium under the tenure-track auditing is also an equilibrium under the periodic auditing. The condit...
Alternative Titles
Full title
Dynamic Incentive Contracts in Multiple Penalty Systems with No-commitment to Tenure-track Auditing
Authors, Artists and Contributors
Author / Creator
Identifiers
Primary Identifiers
Record Identifier
TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_36646352
Permalink
https://devfeature-collection.sl.nsw.gov.au/record/TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_36646352
Other Identifiers
ISSN
0931-8658
E-ISSN
1617-7134
DOI
10.1007/s00712-006-0241-3
