INCENTIVE CONTRACTS UNDER IMPERFECT AUDITING
INCENTIVE CONTRACTS UNDER IMPERFECT AUDITING
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Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd
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English
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Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd
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In this paper we analyze the optimal incentive contracts under imperfect auditing. Both principal's commitment and no commitment to auditing cases are investigated. In the commitment case, the Baron–Besanko‐type (RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 15 (1984), pp. 447–470) contract would fail under imperfect auditing. In the no‐commitment case, the Baro...
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Full title
INCENTIVE CONTRACTS UNDER IMPERFECT AUDITING
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TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_36853619
Permalink
https://devfeature-collection.sl.nsw.gov.au/record/TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_36853619
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ISSN
1463-6786
E-ISSN
1467-9957
DOI
10.1111/j.1467-9957.2007.01053.x
