DYNAMIC INCENTIVE CONTRACTS UNDER NO COMMITMENT TO PERIODIC AUDITING AND A RETROSPECTIVE PENALTY SYS...
DYNAMIC INCENTIVE CONTRACTS UNDER NO COMMITMENT TO PERIODIC AUDITING AND A RETROSPECTIVE PENALTY SYSTEM
About this item
Full title
Author / Creator
Publisher
Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Journal title
Language
English
Formats
Publication information
Publisher
Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Subjects
More information
Scope and Contents
Contents
This study extends Khalil's (RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 28 (1997), No. 4, pp. 629–640) model to a multiperiod one under no principal's commitment to periodic auditing and a retrospective penalty system. The optimal dynamic contracts may not exist. When they exist, there is no sure first‐period auditing and either the first‐best or a single con...
Alternative Titles
Full title
DYNAMIC INCENTIVE CONTRACTS UNDER NO COMMITMENT TO PERIODIC AUDITING AND A RETROSPECTIVE PENALTY SYSTEM
Authors, Artists and Contributors
Author / Creator
Identifiers
Primary Identifiers
Record Identifier
TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_38221822
Permalink
https://devfeature-collection.sl.nsw.gov.au/record/TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_38221822
Other Identifiers
ISSN
1463-6786
E-ISSN
1467-9957
DOI
10.1111/j.1467-9957.2006.00488.x
