Political Incentives to Suppress Negative Information: Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms
Political Incentives to Suppress Negative Information: Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms
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Publisher
Chicago: Blackwell Publishing Ltd
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Language
English
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Publisher
Chicago: Blackwell Publishing Ltd
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Scope and Contents
Contents
This paper tests the proposition that politicians and their affiliated firms (i.e., firms operating in their province) temporarily suppress negative information in response to political incentives. We examine the stock price behavior of Chinese listed firms around two visible political events—meetings of the National Congress of the Chinese Communi...
Alternative Titles
Full title
Political Incentives to Suppress Negative Information: Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms
Authors, Artists and Contributors
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TN_cdi_pubmedcentral_primary_oai_pubmedcentral_nih_gov_7166360
Permalink
https://devfeature-collection.sl.nsw.gov.au/record/TN_cdi_pubmedcentral_primary_oai_pubmedcentral_nih_gov_7166360
Other Identifiers
ISSN
0021-8456
E-ISSN
1475-679X
DOI
10.1111/1475-679X.12071
