POLITICAL BUDGET CYCLES WITH INFORMED VOTERS: EVIDENCE FROM ITALY
POLITICAL BUDGET CYCLES WITH INFORMED VOTERS: EVIDENCE FROM ITALY
About this item
Full title
Author / Creator
Publisher
Oxford: John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Journal title
Language
English
Formats
Publication information
Publisher
Oxford: John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Subjects
More information
Scope and Contents
Contents
I exploit a reform that required Italian municipalities to disclose their balance sheets before elections to study whether having more informed voters affects the political budget cycle. Municipal investment in the year before elections is 28.5% higher than in electoral years, and the reform reduced this pre-electoral spending increase by one third...
Alternative Titles
Full title
POLITICAL BUDGET CYCLES WITH INFORMED VOTERS: EVIDENCE FROM ITALY
Authors, Artists and Contributors
Author / Creator
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Primary Identifiers
Record Identifier
TN_cdi_swepub_primary_oai_DiVA_org_uu_424181
Permalink
https://devfeature-collection.sl.nsw.gov.au/record/TN_cdi_swepub_primary_oai_DiVA_org_uu_424181
Other Identifiers
ISSN
0013-0133,1468-0297
E-ISSN
1468-0297
DOI
10.1111/ecoj.12570
