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Killer Acquisitions

Killer Acquisitions

https://devfeature-collection.sl.nsw.gov.au/record/TN_cdi_uchicagopress_journals_712506

Killer Acquisitions

About this item

Full title

Killer Acquisitions

Publisher

Chicago: The University of Chicago Press

Journal title

The Journal of political economy, 2021-03, Vol.129 (3), p.649-702

Language

English

Formats

Publication information

Publisher

Chicago: The University of Chicago Press

More information

Scope and Contents

Contents

This paper argues that incumbent firms may acquire innovative targets solely to discontinue the target’s innovation projects and preempt future competition. We call such acquisitions “killer acquisitions.” We develop a model illustrating this phenomenon. Using pharmaceutical industry data, we show that acquired drug projects are less likely to be d...

Alternative Titles

Full title

Killer Acquisitions

Authors, Artists and Contributors

Identifiers

Primary Identifiers

Record Identifier

TN_cdi_uchicagopress_journals_712506

Permalink

https://devfeature-collection.sl.nsw.gov.au/record/TN_cdi_uchicagopress_journals_712506

Other Identifiers

ISSN

0022-3808

E-ISSN

1537-534X

DOI

10.1086/712506

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